problems just mentioned in a distributed way, game theory is a natural and powerful tool which studies how selfish nodes interact and cooperate with each other. In this area, Zhaoyang [1] studied a symmetric relay model in which each node can act as both a source and a relay based on the cooperative game theory. Beibei [2] proposes a Stackelberg game to perform the resource allocation. The game is formulated as a buyers' market competition where multiple relays compete with each other in terms of price to gain the highest profit from offering power to a single user.
Unlike [1] and [2] , we study an asymmetric relay model by considering the problem of how a relay should coordinate resource allocation among multiple competing users. We formulate this problem as a sellers' market competition and use a pricing-based noncooperative game to jointly consider the benefits of the relay and the users.
II. System Model and Problem Formulation
An asymmetric relay model is illustrated in Fig. 1 . A transmitter-receiver pair including a source node s i and destination node d i is referred to as a user i. A node r closer to the destination nodes is designated as the potential relay.
Without the loss of generality, we employ the amplify-andforward (AF) cooperation protocol in the system and consider basing the system on frequency-division multiple access (FDMA). Each node is allocated w Hz bandwidth for transmission. The relay r is willing to share portions of its bandwidth with the users for cooperative transmission. The energy required to relay a packet is assumed to be constant as in [2] and [3] .
Let I={1,⋅⋅⋅, N} denote the set of users currently in the system. If relay r decides to share bandwidth w i (0≤w i ≤w) with user i, it will relay w i of the data originating from source s i . That means w i of source s i 's data will be transmitted in a cooperative manner, and the remaining w-w i parts can only be directly transmitted to destination d i without any relaying. Cooperation refers to a real cost of resource expenditure, and the relay could cover this cost by selling its bandwidth to the users. Define user i's strategy as the bandwidth size, w i , that he wants to buy from the relay. The pricing function used by the relay to charge the users is defined as in [5] 
where a and b are non-negative constants, and W={w 1 ,…, w N } denotes the set of strategies adopted by all users. Given the current relaying price c, each selfish user prefers to maximize his benefit/utility by adjusting his strategy. Since price c depends on the strategies of all users, the resource competition between the users is actually a strategic game. We call it a cooperative transmission game (CTG).
A kind of utility function which can qualify the tradeoff between achieving high throughput and low energy consumption is defined as u=T/p (bits per Joule) as in [4] , where T and p are user's throughput and transmission power, respectively. Considering that the user transmits L bits of data packed into a frame of M (M > L) bits with bandwidth w, the throughput of the user can be expressed as
M is the efficiency function to approximate the probability of correct reception of a frame, 
,
where p i is the transmit power of source s i , , , 
is the throughput derived from the cooperative transmission helped by relay r with bandwidth w i , and the last term, c.w i , represents the payment paid by user i to relay r for resource consumption.
III. Solving the Game
The Nash equilibrium (NE) is the solution to a noncooperative game. At the NE, no user can increase his utility by choosing a different strategy, given the other users' best strategies.
Since the relaying price c is determined by the demand of all users, by substituting (1) into (2), we obtain , ,
where
Denote the set of best strategies of all users except user i as . The best strategy of user i is given by * * arg max ( , )
The best strategy profile of all the users,
w , is then the NE of the CTG.
To solve the CTG, we take the derivative of (3) with respect to w i and set each derivative to 0. Then, we can have the following set of N equations:
The solution of this equation set is the NE of the CTG. However, it can only be solved in a centralized manner since the strategies adopted by other users should be available to each user. We developed a strategy update function to help users search the NE of the CTG in a distributed manner:
where θ i is the speed adjustment parameter of user i, w i (t) is the amount of bandwidth allocated to user i at time t, and w i (t+1) is the strategy that will be adopted by user i at time t+1. This strategy update function is based on the marginal profit function borrowed from microeconomics, which only depends on the pricing information from the relay. The basic idea of the algorithm is that each user i's NE strategy should ensure ∂U i /∂w i =0 at any time. Otherwise, if the bandwidth size allocated to user i is less than the optimal one at time t, ∂U i /∂w i will change from zero to positive. According to (6), user i will increase his/her demand at time t+1 to maximize his/her utility. If the bandwidth size allocated to user i is more than the optimal one at time t, the situation reverses. When the NE is reached, the condition w i (t+1)=w i (t)=w i * is satisfied. This means user i cannot unilaterally improve his/her utility by choosing a different strategy. This analysis demonstrates that the users' strategies could converge to the NE if (6) is performed in a distributed and iterative manner.
IV. Simulation Results
A two-user simulated system is shown in Fig. 1 . The other parameters used in the simulations include L=64, M=80, and BER(γ)=1/2exp(-γ/2) for noncoherent frequency shift keying. We locate the two source nodes and the two destination nodes at (0, -50), (0, 50), (200, -50) and (200, 50). The x coordinate of relay r is fixed at 80, and its y coordinate is varied from -200 to Figure 2 shows the optimal bandwidth size bought by the two users from the relay, while Fig. 3 depicts the relevant price charged by the relay at the NE. When -200<Y r <-125, the bandwidth size bought by user 1 gradually increases to the maximum, whereas that of user 2 is almost 0. This is because, in this region, relay r is much closer to source s 1 than to source s 2 . When -125<Y r <0, the channel conditions from both source nodes to the relay become better. Although the service price continues increasing, user 2 would like to buy more bandwidth for cooperative transmission from the relay. When the relay moves to the coordinate (80, 0), a fair resource allocation between the users is achieved because both users have the same channel conditions to the relay. Also, the revenue of the relay reaches the maximum because the users' demand is highest at this point. When 0<Y r <200, the situation reverses.
Since the y coordinate of the relay represents the nodes' channel conditions, the two basic issues mentioned in section I, are addressed. Note that time-varying fading is not considered here. Otherwise, the x-axis represents the channel conditions instead of the y coordinate of the relay.
V. Conclusion
This letter has proposed a noncooperative game to perform the bandwidth allocation in FDMA-based cooperative relay networks. A distributed algorithm was also developed to find the Nash equilibrium of the game was used to solve the two basic problems of when and how to cooperate.
